"The requirements of foreign policy, as opposed to military deployments and operations, were designed to be compatible with Britain’s past and present imperial role, but in ways which reflected some of the new post-war circumstances that were no longer in line with the military’s imperial conceptions"
"...any weakening of Britain’s positioning the Mediterranean was deemed likely to cause the end of social democracy."
Hilarious statement, especially when you remember the old and deep ties that European social democrats have with Britain.
"...what united the FO and the military in their approach to imperial defence was the idea of maximising the appearance of British world power through a military presence in the Middle East. This concept was to remain, albeit in changing guises, both before and after the debacle of Suez in 1956, and the imperial element, defined as the projection of power, still continues in Mr Blair’s conception of a ‘pivotal’ world role for Britain."
"The formation of NATO did not lead to a greater military emphasis on a continental commitment at the expense of imperial defence by the military. The British military did not believe that the Russians would attack Western Europe and hence questioned the need for forces to defend the Continent."
"The problem by August 1949 was not just the American reluctance to accept the three pillars (Britain, the Middle East and the defence of sea communications) of imperial defence. The FO feared the economic consequences of Europe not recovering and dragging Britain down, so policy makers found it easier to accept a special place in an American-dominated alliance. Yet they remained committed to some lesser form of integration and cooperation with Western Europe as this could provide the Americans with a rationale for Britain’s special position."
"The retreat from empire in the sense of its military/strategic raison d’être or in the influence and prestige that a military commitment represented was not underway. The provision of ‘security’ through bases and their apparent strategic rationale could give a power like Britain, seeking the preservation of a global role, important cards to play. Even if imperialism and empire were no longer acceptable words, and even if Britain lacked the military resources to carry out effective operations, there was the Cold War."
"Unfortunately for Britain’s global military role, the United States then confirmed in June 1950 that they had no intention of sending forces to assist in the air defence of the Middle East because they did not intend to use the area as a base for long-range bombing. Worse was soon to follow to reveal the futility of a British, or indeed a European, commitment to the conventional defence of Western Europe."
The melancholic tone of this essay should not be misleading - despite the inability to maintain a traditionally huge army and navy, Britain was able to retain much of their influence.
"...it was decided that British defence plans could not be disclosed to the Middle Eastern states as ‘the little the UK can actually do to protect the Middle East’ was more likely to lower the morale than to raise it."
"It was already obvious that the idea of imperial defence, even meaning only the most vital area (the defence of the Middle East), was somewhat spurious given the lack of British resources which simply could not provide for the operations that were necessary to implement the strategy."
"The reality was that the military and the FO were now both committed to the Cold War as a means of removing the imperial stigma while still ensuring that the old imperial values of projecting power in the world remained to benefit Britain’s global status. The alleged military defence needs would continue to provide a justification for this essentially imperial strategy."
"The foreign policy of the United Kingdom towards the Soviet Union after the Second World War was rooted in Britain’s traditional policy toward Russia, stretching back at least to the nineteenth century. Geo-politics even more than ideological rivalry have shaped British reactions to Russian intentions and other than during two brief periods of coalition with Russia in the two world wars, and only then in the face of a common enemy, the normal condition of Anglo–Russian relations has been one of rivalry, mutual distrust and suspicion. The British response has been to seek to contain the perceived threat emanating from Russia. Containment is usually associated with United States policy during the Cold War, but as a tactic of statecraft it is much older and was practised by Britain against Russia from the nineteenth century. The result has been an intermittent Anglo–Russian Cold War for over two centuries."
"One of the phenomena of nineteenth-century British politics was the rise of popular Russophobia. The popular image of Russia was best summed up by Rudyard Kipling in Kim, where he talks of ‘the dread power of the North’, and this linking of ‘dread’ with Russia appears frequently. Lord Derby in 1876 noted in his diary, ‘Already in the newspapers I see that the old dread of Russia is regaining strength.’"
"Indeed in 1926 Birkenhead was telling the Imperial conference that, ‘The policy initiated by Peter the Great of penetrating to the warm water has not changed with changing forms of government.’ One important aspect of Curzon’s strategy at the Lausanne negotiations, which resolved the crisis, was to block Soviet influence in the new Turkey. Once again Britain was anxious to prevent any extension of Russian influence to the south."
"In 1923 Curzon, together with others involved with foreign policy, became increasingly concerned about Soviet propaganda in Asia and the Near and Middle East. This led to the Curzon Note of May 1923, which threatened the breaking off of the existing de facto relations should the Soviet Union persist in these and other antagonistic policies. Hardliners in the Foreign Office were delighted by the possibility of moving more fully to isolate Russia. J.D. Gregory, head of the Foreign Office’s Northern Department, commented that this was a ‘great opportunity for us who would like a break anyhow’. At this critical juncture the rapidly ailing Prime Minister, Bonar Law, resigned and was replaced by Stanley Baldwin. The new Prime Minister, more concerned about possible trade benefits than high imperial policy, moved to avert a rupture, saying during his first week as Prime Minister, ‘we must try to avoid a break with Russia’. The Soviets moved to accommodate the British on most points, thus satisfying Baldwin and initiating an improvement in relations."
"The first Labour Government, led by Ramsay MacDonald, took office in January 1924, with MacDonald also serving as Foreign Secretary. MacDonald said at his Party’s victory celebration that he would end, ‘The pompous folly of standing aloof from the Russian Government’. He had earlier been critical of the Bolsheviks, largely because of their quashing of Georgian independence, but MacDonald now hastened the process of granting de jure recognition, partly out of concern that Italy might steal a march and become the first of the Allied states to open full relations with the Soviet Union. MacDonald also negotiated an Anglo–Soviet treaty, intended to resolve and clarify a number of issues between the governments, which would allow for the normalisation of relations. Before the treaty could be ratified, however, MacDonald was forced to call new elections."
"Chamberlain’s efforts to run an aloof but flexible foreign policy on this issue came under sustained attack from his die-hard Cabinet colleagues, such as Joynson-Hicks, Churchill and Birkenhead. The first issue relating to Russia which the new government confronted was the accusation by some hardliners, such as the Home Secretary, Joynson-Hicks, that Russia were fomenting unrest in China, and thereby threatening British interests. Chamberlain’s reaction was to be cool but proper to Moscow. He observed that ‘it would be very inexpedient to provoke a controversy with the Soviet Gov[ernmen]t if it can be avoided, and that the less attention we pay to them the more anxious they will be to come to terms with us’. He advised the cabinet that Britain’s policy should be ‘to keep the formal relations as distant as possible’. Chamberlain’s success at Locarno in 1925 helped to establish his ascendancy in foreign policy, and to diminish the influence of these die-hards. Chamberlain’s intellectual vision of British foreign policy was based on a return to traditional British responses. It is perhaps significant that Chamberlain installed a portrait of Castlereagh, who had conducted a similar policy, in the new Locarno Suite at the Foreign Office, as the presiding deity in British foreign affairs. The Locarno agreements were the result of the return of balance of power policy towards Western Europe."
