Schizo Мой Blog

[Ree Vannin]

"He reiterated the need for good publicity work in response to a letter on 26 May from Sir Oliver Franks, the British Ambassador in Washington, who reported on the tensions in Anglo–American relations over Korea, Taiwan and China. Franks noted that the American people were shocked and annoyed to find that their main and most dependable ally was not always 100 per cent with them in every policy. Even when our policy does not change, he added, the constant reiteration of our attitudes and views by the British government was an essential approach to the US public."

"In a conversation with Gifford about the crisis stemming from the Iranian Government’s nationalisation of the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), Morrison said that he objected to the US Government continually putting the breaks on the British Government. ‘Apologising for frank speaking, I said that we were tired of being lectured by the United States.’ ‘The Ambassador took my remarks in good part and admitted that in his view the United States Government shared the responsibility for the failure of our negotiations with Dr Mussadiq.’"

 

[Ree Vannin]

"In a conversation with Gifford about the crisis stemming from the Iranian Government’s nationalisation of the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), Morrison said that he objected to the US Government continually putting the breaks on the British Government. ‘Apologising for frank speaking, I said that we were tired of being lectured by the United States.’ ‘The Ambassador took my remarks in good part and admitted that in his view the United States Government shared the responsibility for the failure of our negotiations with Dr Mussadiq.’"

"A Japanese Peace Treaty was successfully negotiated and signed in September. And here, as Younger observed, Foreign Office advice was of a better order. The negotiations succeeded partly because they were less concerned with British prestige, and partly because the Americans decided so much of the final terms. The Soviets attended the San Francisco conference that finalised the Treaty. Their Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, put forward amendments to the Anglo–American draft treaty but he did not push them very hard. Nor did he raise procedural difficulties, as the British and Americans had feared. A combination of Acheson’s astute chairmanship and a rather restrained Soviet approach ensured that the conference succeeded in completing the formal signature of the Treaty."

 

[Ree Vannin]

"A Japanese Peace Treaty was successfully negotiated and signed in September. And here, as Younger observed, Foreign Office advice was of a better order. The negotiations succeeded partly because they were less concerned with British prestige, and partly because the Americans decided so much of the final terms. The Soviets attended the San Francisco conference that finalised the Treaty. Their Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, put forward amendments to the Anglo–American draft treaty but he did not push them very hard. Nor did he raise procedural difficulties, as the British and Americans had feared. A combination of Acheson’s astute chairmanship and a rather restrained Soviet approach ensured that the conference succeeded in completing the formal signature of the Treaty."

"Ever since the Marshall Plan in 1947 the Americans had wanted to see closer cooperation between the Europeans. Bevin had resisted moves towards integration. Interestingly, during Morrison’s time as Foreign Secretary Britain moved more in the direction that the Americans favoured. In conversation with Pierson Dixon, Morrison explained how there would be a somewhat different emphasis in the government’s attitude towards integration among the Europeans themselves. Britain now intended to adopt a more encouraging attitude towards such tendencies in Europe."

 

[Ree Vannin]

"Ever since the Marshall Plan in 1947 the Americans had wanted to see closer cooperation between the Europeans. Bevin had resisted moves towards integration. Interestingly, during Morrison’s time as Foreign Secretary Britain moved more in the direction that the Americans favoured. In conversation with Pierson Dixon, Morrison explained how there would be a somewhat different emphasis in the government’s attitude towards integration among the Europeans themselves. Britain now intended to adopt a more encouraging attitude towards such tendencies in Europe."

"Herbert Morrison made an important contribution to the Anglo–American relationship generally and to Cold War solidarity between the two powers. He was consistently friendly to the United States. But this did not preclude arguing with them. He managed to allay their fears about the Labour programme of nationalisation. His consistent anti-communism was undoubtedly a reassurance for Americans who worried about British socialism."

 

[Ree Vannin]

"Herbert Morrison made an important contribution to the Anglo–American relationship generally and to Cold War solidarity between the two powers. He was consistently friendly to the United States. But this did not preclude arguing with them. He managed to allay their fears about the Labour programme of nationalisation. His consistent anti-communism was undoubtedly a reassurance for Americans who worried about British socialism."

"His attitude to European developments has been greatly underrated. By encouraging both Franco–German rapprochement and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community or Schuman Plan, he displayed wisdom, for he favoured policies that succeeded, and honesty, for he recognised his earlier, more sceptical attitude had to change."

 

[Ree Vannin]

Started to read "Cold War Britain, 1945–1964 New Perspectives"

"Drawing on the ‘special relationship’ between London and Washington, American diplomats contacted the Attlee Government regarding proposals for a multilateral export programme on East–West trade in September 1948. Subsequently, the Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA) forwarded copies of both the 1-A and 1-B Lists to the British Foreign Office. By contrast, the other participating European governments only received the contents of the 1-A List."

 

[Ree Vannin]

"Drawing on the ‘special relationship’ between London and Washington, American diplomats contacted the Attlee Government regarding proposals for a multilateral export programme on East–West trade in September 1948. Subsequently, the Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA) forwarded copies of both the 1-A and 1-B Lists to the British Foreign Office. By contrast, the other participating European governments only received the contents of the 1-A List."

"While policy-makers in Whitehall agreed with the objectives of economic containment, they were concerned that a wide-ranging strategic embargo would be detrimental to Western European commercial relationships with the Soviet bloc governments."

 

[Ree Vannin]

"While policy-makers in Whitehall agreed with the objectives of economic containment, they were concerned that a wide-ranging strategic embargo would be detrimental to Western European commercial relationships with the Soviet bloc governments."

"If supplies of grain, timber, potash and coal could no longer be procured from these markets on account of an extensive Western strategic embargo, these items would have to be replaced from dollar sources. The net effect of this scenario, they pointed out, would be an exacerbation of the dollar gap between Washington and London to such an extent that it would prove almost impossible for the Attlee Government to fulfil the economic objectives required under the Marshall Plan."

 

[Ree Vannin]

"If supplies of grain, timber, potash and coal could no longer be procured from these markets on account of an extensive Western strategic embargo, these items would have to be replaced from dollar sources. The net effect of this scenario, they pointed out, would be an exacerbation of the dollar gap between Washington and London to such an extent that it would prove almost impossible for the Attlee Government to fulfil the economic objectives required under the Marshall Plan."

"What is more, policy planners in Whitehall concluded that the impact of the dollar gap crisis would not only continue to paralyse the domestic economy, it would ultimately undermine Britain’s global presence and position as Washington’s most important Cold War ally."

 

[Ree Vannin]

"What is more, policy planners in Whitehall concluded that the impact of the dollar gap crisis would not only continue to paralyse the domestic economy, it would ultimately undermine Britain’s global presence and position as Washington’s most important Cold War ally."

GEG, Brits literally said "If you don't allow us to trade with your main enemy, we won't be able to be your main ally."

 

[Ree Vannin]

"What is more, policy planners in Whitehall concluded that the impact of the dollar gap crisis would not only continue to paralyse the domestic economy, it would ultimately undermine Britain’s global presence and position as Washington’s most important Cold War ally."

"programme would not jeopardise France’s existing import agreements in raw materials and foodstuffs with several Eastern European countries. France’s decision to partner Britain in establishing a multilateral export control programme with the other more reticent OEEC governments culminated in the development of a new list of items to be prohibited in trade with the Soviet bloc. The Anglo–French (A-F) List, which was based on the Board of Trade/Ministry of Defence List, contained 125 of the 163 items on the 1-A List. As far as one senior French official was concerned, the new list offered ‘the highest common agreement’ that could be obtained by the OEEC nations on the American list."

 

[Ree Vannin]

"programme would not jeopardise France’s existing import agreements in raw materials and foodstuffs with several Eastern European countries. France’s decision to partner Britain in establishing a multilateral export control programme with the other more reticent OEEC governments culminated in the development of a new list of items to be prohibited in trade with the Soviet bloc. The Anglo–French (A-F) List, which was based on the Board of Trade/Ministry of Defence List, contained 125 of the 163 items on the 1-A List. As far as one senior French official was concerned, the new list offered ‘the highest common agreement’ that could be obtained by the OEEC nations on the American list."

"The United Kingdom’s effort, in the early months of 1949, to generate support for a strategic embargo amongst the leading members of Western Europe was largely to no avail. Despite close cooperation on mutual security evidenced by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April, Western European governments were reluctant to place restrictions on East–West trade. This disinclination to regulate the shipment of strategic exports to Eastern Europe was perhaps surprising given that the growing Soviet military threat and the uncertain future of Germany alarmed many OEEC governments."

 

[Ree Vannin]

"The United Kingdom’s effort, in the early months of 1949, to generate support for a strategic embargo amongst the leading members of Western Europe was largely to no avail. Despite close cooperation on mutual security evidenced by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April, Western European governments were reluctant to place restrictions on East–West trade. This disinclination to regulate the shipment of strategic exports to Eastern Europe was perhaps surprising given that the growing Soviet military threat and the uncertain future of Germany alarmed many OEEC governments."

"While British firms were forced to reduce shipments of exports in industrial goods to Eastern Europe, their continental counterparts continued to trade with the Soviet bloc countries unhindered by commercial restrictions. As a result of this policy of trade discrimination towards Eastern Europe and the corresponding decline of British exports to the Soviet bloc region, many manufacturers suffered heavy economic losses. Smaller firms dependent on Eastern European markets were forced to close, precipitating high levels of unemployment in several regions throughout the United Kingdom."

 

[Ree Vannin]

"While British firms were forced to reduce shipments of exports in industrial goods to Eastern Europe, their continental counterparts continued to trade with the Soviet bloc countries unhindered by commercial restrictions. As a result of this policy of trade discrimination towards Eastern Europe and the corresponding decline of British exports to the Soviet bloc region, many manufacturers suffered heavy economic losses. Smaller firms dependent on Eastern European markets were forced to close, precipitating high levels of unemployment in several regions throughout the United Kingdom."

"In late summer 1949 several Western European nations retracted their opposition to a strategic embargo on East–West trade. This sudden reversal of policy was due to two factors. First, in August the French Government followed the example of the Attlee Government and published a national list of exports to be prohibited in trade with the Soviet bloc. Second, and most significantly, the consolidation of Soviet power in Eastern Europe through a series of communist coups together with Moscow’s confrontation with the NATO powers over Berlin forced the OEEC nations to place national security considerations ahead of trade interests."

 

[Ree Vannin]

"In late summer 1949 several Western European nations retracted their opposition to a strategic embargo on East–West trade. This sudden reversal of policy was due to two factors. First, in August the French Government followed the example of the Attlee Government and published a national list of exports to be prohibited in trade with the Soviet bloc. Second, and most significantly, the consolidation of Soviet power in Eastern Europe through a series of communist coups together with Moscow’s confrontation with the NATO powers over Berlin forced the OEEC nations to place national security considerations ahead of trade interests."

"It is important to note that far from capitulating to the demands of the USA at the trilateral meetings in November the British and French governments did not accept the 1-B List for embargo in its entirety. They refused to embargo a large number of industrial commodities which they deemed to have substantial economic value in trade with Eastern Europe. Following the agreement reached by the three powers in London, the multilateral export control programme was expanded by CoCom in December to incorporate some of the semi-strategic items contained on the 1-B List. This increased the total number of exports under control by the CoCom membership to almost four hundred items. While American diplomats were satisfied with this outcome, the European members appeared to benefit most from the compromise negotiated by Britain and France."

 

[Ree Vannin]

"It is important to note that far from capitulating to the demands of the USA at the trilateral meetings in November the British and French governments did not accept the 1-B List for embargo in its entirety. They refused to embargo a large number of industrial commodities which they deemed to have substantial economic value in trade with Eastern Europe. Following the agreement reached by the three powers in London, the multilateral export control programme was expanded by CoCom in December to incorporate some of the semi-strategic items contained on the 1-B List. This increased the total number of exports under control by the CoCom membership to almost four hundred items. While American diplomats were satisfied with this outcome, the European members appeared to benefit most from the compromise negotiated by Britain and France."

"Since 1948 congressional representatives had insisted, through the Mundt Amendment to the Economic Cooperation Act, that the Administration should withhold economic and military assistance from ERP nations refusing to impose restrictions on East–West trade. Now, at the height of the Korean War, they decided to take legislative measures, in the interests of national security, to deny aid to American allies that persisted in maintaining normal trading relations with the Soviet Union."

 

[Ree Vannin]

"Since 1948 congressional representatives had insisted, through the Mundt Amendment to the Economic Cooperation Act, that the Administration should withhold economic and military assistance from ERP nations refusing to impose restrictions on East–West trade. Now, at the height of the Korean War, they decided to take legislative measures, in the interests of national security, to deny aid to American allies that persisted in maintaining normal trading relations with the Soviet Union."

"In contrast to the findings of some historians, the newly elected Churchill Government and its European partners were clearly outraged by these developments and took a firm stance against this perceived interference by a foreign legislature in the making of their international trade policies. As the newly declassified evidence demonstrates, the Foreign Office, for the most part, ignored the threats of aid denial levelled by the US Congress."

 

[Ree Vannin]

"In contrast to the findings of some historians, the newly elected Churchill Government and its European partners were clearly outraged by these developments and took a firm stance against this perceived interference by a foreign legislature in the making of their international trade policies. As the newly declassified evidence demonstrates, the Foreign Office, for the most part, ignored the threats of aid denial levelled by the US Congress."

"Contrary to recent scholarship which has concluded that the Americans ‘coerced’ their CoCom partners into accepting a strategic embargo beyond their economic means, the Western Europeans were able to mount an effective challenge against the restrictive conditions of the congressional legislation."

 

[Ree Vannin]

"Contrary to recent scholarship which has concluded that the Americans ‘coerced’ their CoCom partners into accepting a strategic embargo beyond their economic means, the Western Europeans were able to mount an effective challenge against the restrictive conditions of the congressional legislation."

"The partial relaxation of Cold War tensions between the Western alliance and the Soviet Union precipitated by Stalin’s death and the truce in Korea in 1953 led to a substantial reduction in the strategic embargo by August 1954. This was a crucial period in Britain’s involvement in the multilateral export control programme because it showed the considerable leverage London possessed over the USA in CoCom. It demonstrated, furthermore, the continuing divergence between the positions of the two governments over the scope and content of the East–West trade embargo."

 

[Ree Vannin]

"The partial relaxation of Cold War tensions between the Western alliance and the Soviet Union precipitated by Stalin’s death and the truce in Korea in 1953 led to a substantial reduction in the strategic embargo by August 1954. This was a crucial period in Britain’s involvement in the multilateral export control programme because it showed the considerable leverage London possessed over the USA in CoCom. It demonstrated, furthermore, the continuing divergence between the positions of the two governments over the scope and content of the East–West trade embargo."

"The Economic Steering Committee (ESC) of the Cabinet made several recommendations regarding trade policy towards Eastern Europe. First, it found that the international lists which underpinned the export control programme were obsolete. The recent development of the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons programmes had highlighted the ineffectiveness of the embargo in preventing Moscow from acquiring military raw materials from alternative sources. Second, now that tensions between the Western powers and the Soviet Union had eased considerably Britain should reopen her trade contacts with Eastern Europe in order to stimulate economic growth and recovery. Finally, the ECS suggested that the CoCom membership should dispense with the current international export control lists and, instead, establish a single list composed of those items only of high military value to the Kremlin."