Schizo Мой Blog

Reading "The Foreign Office and the defence of empire, 1919–1939" by Keith Neilson from this book. Not as interesting as the first essay.
"While the defence of India and British interests in the Middle East occupied much time and thought, by far the greatest difficulty for imperial defence after the First World War was to protect British interests in the Far East. This was due to the fact that the Far East involved a greater number of issues than did any other area. In that region, formulating British strategic foreign policy involved dealing with the complicated tangle of Great Power relations among Britain, Japan, China, Soviet Russia and the United States. And, as imperial defence in the Pacific centred on naval issues, it also was intimately involved with the twin issues of naval arms control and disarmament. Various British departments of state ranged on opposing sides, with the Admiralty, the War Office and the Treasury all possessed of differing (and contradictory) views as to how best to ensure British security. The FO’s task was to establish a policy that resolved all these issues."
 
"While the defence of India and British interests in the Middle East occupied much time and thought, by far the greatest difficulty for imperial defence after the First World War was to protect British interests in the Far East. This was due to the fact that the Far East involved a greater number of issues than did any other area. In that region, formulating British strategic foreign policy involved dealing with the complicated tangle of Great Power relations among Britain, Japan, China, Soviet Russia and the United States. And, as imperial defence in the Pacific centred on naval issues, it also was intimately involved with the twin issues of naval arms control and disarmament. Various British departments of state ranged on opposing sides, with the Admiralty, the War Office and the Treasury all possessed of differing (and contradictory) views as to how best to ensure British security. The FO’s task was to establish a policy that resolved all these issues."
"As the war came to an end, and as the date for the expiry of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance drew closer, the FO had to ponder whether a renewal of the agreement still served British strategic needs. While Japan had proved a useful ally, particularly in the naval war, Japan’s aggressive actions on the Asian continent were clearly a menace to Britain’s imperial possessions. However, as the Admiralty pointed out at the end of the war, to abrogate the alliance would mean that Britain faced a period of naval inferiority in the Far East. For the FO, the position was even more complicated. American–Japanese relations had deteriorated during the war, and the Americans believed that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was aimed at them. This, combined with American unhappiness over the British blockade during the First World War, raised the spectre of an Anglo-American naval race unless Washington could be convinced that no sinister Anglo-Japanese naval combination existed. The ideal solution would be an Anglo-American agreement in the Far East, but this was not a likely prospect. The FO thus had to balance good Anglo-American relations against the Far Eastern security provided by the ongoing relationship with Japan."
 
"As the war came to an end, and as the date for the expiry of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance drew closer, the FO had to ponder whether a renewal of the agreement still served British strategic needs. While Japan had proved a useful ally, particularly in the naval war, Japan’s aggressive actions on the Asian continent were clearly a menace to Britain’s imperial possessions. However, as the Admiralty pointed out at the end of the war, to abrogate the alliance would mean that Britain faced a period of naval inferiority in the Far East. For the FO, the position was even more complicated. American–Japanese relations had deteriorated during the war, and the Americans believed that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was aimed at them. This, combined with American unhappiness over the British blockade during the First World War, raised the spectre of an Anglo-American naval race unless Washington could be convinced that no sinister Anglo-Japanese naval combination existed. The ideal solution would be an Anglo-American agreement in the Far East, but this was not a likely prospect. The FO thus had to balance good Anglo-American relations against the Far Eastern security provided by the ongoing relationship with Japan."
Interesting how with the disappearance of the Russian threat in the Far East, British attention shifted to the United States rather than Japan, which was used more as a tool against British opponents in this region.
 
"As the war came to an end, and as the date for the expiry of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance drew closer
"The fall of France and the Italian declaration of war in June 1940 made the situation in the Far East even more difficult. With the Japanese moving into French Indo-China, the security of British lines of communication to the Far East becoming less reliable than ever, and America’s apparent unwillingness to take any concrete actions against Japan, the FO contemplated making a general settlement with Japan. But this alternative would have involved abandoning China, and both forfeiting any American help that might be forthcoming in the Far East and lessening American support for Britain in the European conflict. If diplomacy were to continue to substitute for military power in imperial defence, then Britain must appear to have no truck with aggressors. This circumstance remained until Pearl Harbor converted the ‘no bloc’ policy into the Grand Alliance."
 
"The fall of France and the Italian declaration of war in June 1940 made the situation in the Far East even more difficult. With the Japanese moving into French Indo-China, the security of British lines of communication to the Far East becoming less reliable than ever, and America’s apparent unwillingness to take any concrete actions against Japan, the FO contemplated making a general settlement with Japan. But this alternative would have involved abandoning China, and both forfeiting any American help that might be forthcoming in the Far East and lessening American support for Britain in the European conflict. If diplomacy were to continue to substitute for military power in imperial defence, then Britain must appear to have no truck with aggressors. This circumstance remained until Pearl Harbor converted the ‘no bloc’ policy into the Grand Alliance."
As soon as British diplomacy and power projection becomes insufficient to contain the Unites States from Far East, their former ally IMMEDIATELY attacks Americans, despite the obvious military, economic, and diplomatic disadvantages. And with this fact essay "The Foreign Office and the defence of empire, 1919–1939" by Keith Neilson ends.
 
As soon as British diplomacy and power projection becomes insufficient to contain the Unites States from Far East, their former ally IMMEDIATELY attacks Americans, despite the obvious military, economic, and diplomatic disadvantages. And with this fact essay "The Foreign Office and the defence of empire, 1919–1939" by Keith Neilson ends.
It's a very boring essay. 80% of the content is just reciting historical facts from Wikipedia. But it's usual for historicans to not write anything meaningful about World War II(or they will be fired immediately), so there's not much we can do about it.
 
Started reading "The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism" by Sir Bertrand Russel
"Bolshevism combines the characteristics of the French Revolution with those of the rise of Islam ; and the result is something radically new, which can only be understood by a patient and passionate effort of imagination."
 
"Bolshevism combines the characteristics of the French Revolution with those of the rise of Islam ; and the result is something radically new, which can only be understood by a patient and passionate effort of imagination."
It's just amazing. This is just the preface, and Russell has already began to mock Bolshevism. I wouldn't have thought about comparing Soviet Russia to Rashidun Caliphate.
 
"Bolshevism combines the characteristics of the French Revolution with those of the rise of Islam ; and the result is something radically new, which can only be understood by a patient and passionate effort of imagination."
"But the method by which Moscow aims at establishing Communism is a pioneer method, rough and dangerous, too heroic to count the cost of the opposition it arouses. I do not believe that by this method a stable or desirable form of Communism can be established. Three issues seem to me possible from the present situation. The first is the ultimate defeat of Bolshevism by the forces of capitalism. Tne second is the victory of the Bolshevists accompanied by a complete loss of their ideals and a regime of Napoleonic imperialism. The third is a prolonged world-war, in which civilization will go under, and all its manifestations (including Communism) will be forgotten."
 
"But the method by which Moscow aims at establishing Communism is a pioneer method, rough and dangerous, too heroic to count the cost of the opposition it arouses. I do not believe that by this method a stable or desirable form of Communism can be established. Three issues seem to me possible from the present situation. The first is the ultimate defeat of Bolshevism by the forces of capitalism. Tne second is the victory of the Bolshevists accompanied by a complete loss of their ideals and a regime of Napoleonic imperialism. The third is a prolonged world-war, in which civilization will go under, and all its manifestations (including Communism) will be forgotten."
Ultimate defeat - happened
Napoleonic Imperialism - happened
Prolonged world-war - happened
 
"But the method by which Moscow aims at establishing Communism is a pioneer method, rough and dangerous, too heroic to count the cost of the opposition it arouses. I do not believe that by this method a stable or desirable form of Communism can be established. Three issues seem to me possible from the present situation. The first is the ultimate defeat of Bolshevism by the forces of capitalism. Tne second is the victory of the Bolshevists accompanied by a complete loss of their ideals and a regime of Napoleonic imperialism. The third is a prolonged world-war, in which civilization will go under, and all its manifestations (including Communism) will be forgotten."
"Bolshevism is not merely a political doctrine ; it is also a religion, with elaborate dogmas and inspired scriptures. When Lenin wishes to prove some proposition, he does so, if possible, by quoting texts from Marx and Engels."
 
"Bolshevism is not merely a political doctrine ; it is also a religion, with elaborate dogmas and inspired scriptures. When Lenin wishes to prove some proposition, he does so, if possible, by quoting texts from Marx and Engels."
"A full-fledged Communist is not merely a man who believes that land and capital should be held in common, and their produce distributed as nearly equally as possible. He is a man who entertains a number of elaborate and dogmatic beliefs - such as philosophic materialism, for example - which may be true, but are not, to a scientific temper, capable of being known to be true with any certainty."
 
"A full-fledged Communist is not merely a man who believes that land and capital should be held in common, and their produce distributed as nearly equally as possible. He is a man who entertains a number of elaborate and dogmatic beliefs - such as philosophic materialism, for example - which may be true, but are not, to a scientific temper, capable of being known to be true with any certainty."
"This habit, of militant certainty about objectively doubtful matters, is one from which, since the Renaissance, the world has been gradually emerging, into that temper of constructive and fruitful scepticism which constitutes the s scientific outlook. I believe the scientific outlook to be immeasurably important to the human race. If a more just economic system were only attainable by closing men's minds against free inquiry, and plunging them back into the intellectual prison of the middle ages, I should consider the price too high."
 
"This habit, of militant certainty about objectively doubtful matters, is one from which, since the Renaissance, the world has been gradually emerging, into that temper of constructive and fruitful scepticism which constitutes the s scientific outlook. I believe the scientific outlook to be immeasurably important to the human race. If a more just economic system were only attainable by closing men's minds against free inquiry, and plunging them back into the intellectual prison of the middle ages, I should consider the price too high."
"I cannot share the hopes of the Bolsheviks any more than those of the Egyptian anchorites; I regard both as tragic delusions, destined to bring upon the world centuries of darkness and futile violence."
 
"I cannot share the hopes of the Bolsheviks any more than those of the Egyptian anchorites; I regard both as tragic delusions, destined to bring upon the world centuries of darkness and futile violence."
"The war has left throughout Europe a mood of disillusionment and despair which calls aloud for a new religion, as the only force capable of giving men the energy to live vigorously. Bolshevism has supplied the new religion."
 
"The war has left throughout Europe a mood of disillusionment and despair which calls aloud for a new religion, as the only force capable of giving men the energy to live vigorously. Bolshevism has supplied the new religion."
"As ignorance diminishes, tradition becomes weakened, and the war destroyed the hold upon men's minds of everything merely traditional. It may be that, through the influence of America, the capitalist system will linger for another fifty years, but it will grow continually weaker, and can never recover the position of easy dominance which it held in the nineteenth century."
 
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